“Xi Jinping Thought” by Garrick, John & Bennett, Yan Chang
 China Perspectives 
2018/1-2 | 2018
New Approaches to the Political Regime Under Xi
Jinping
“Xi Jinping Thought” 
Realisation of the Chinese Dream of National Rejuvenation?
John Garrick and Yan Chang Bennett
Electronic version
URL: http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/7872
ISSN: 1996-4617
Publisher
Centre d'étude français sur la Chine contemporaine
Printed version
Date of publication: 1 June 2018
Number of pages: 99-105
ISSN: 2070-3449
 
Electronic reference
John Garrick and Yan Chang Bennett, « “Xi Jinping Thought”  », China Perspectives [Online], 2018/1-2 |
 2018, Online since 01 June 2018, connection on 28 October 2019. URL : http://
journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/7872 
© All rights reserved
Introduction: A context of epochal change
Xi Jinping’s full report to the 19
th Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Congress in October 2017 seeks to “ensure and improve living stan-
dards through sustainable development;” (1) it condones market “re-
form and opening” (gaige kaifang 改 革 开 放 ) and encourages
Chinese enterprises to “go out” (zou chuqu 走出去) especially along the Silk
Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (2017: 2). China’s
relatively slow growth rate since 2009 has required a rebalancing of its
economy away from investment-led growth and towards a more consump-
tion-driven economy, “the new normal.” This phrase has been commonly
used in China to indicate the importance of this recalibration. Some argue
the recalibration has “stalled” due to the persistence of corruption, a volatile
domestic stock market, and the challenges of crucial reforms in the state-
owned sector. (2) At the same time, power is tightly held by the one-party
system, and the underlying values of this ideology create an intriguing con-
text for examining tension-points in the contested space over global influ-
ence between China and the US, with the latter remaining (for the moment)
the world’s biggest economy.
Now that the National People’s Congress amended the Constitution to
remove presidential term limits (enabling General-Secretary Xi to retain
power indefinitely), Xi holds more power than any Chinese leader before
him except perhaps Mao Zedong. Significantly, the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) backed the NPC’s move, giving Xi a “tight grip on the gun against po-
tential political backlash and popular dissent.” (3) In 2017, the 19th Party
Congress officially incorporated “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chi-
nese Characteristics for a New Era” (Xi Jinping xin shidai zhongguo tese she-
hui zhuyi sixiang 习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想 ) into the CCP
constitution. (4) Xi Jinping Thought (Xi Jinping sixiang 习近平思想), as it is
simply known, is based on his “Four-Pronged Comprehensive Strategy” (si
ge quanmian zhanlüe buju 四个全面战略布局; hereafter “Four Comprehen-
sives”). The Four Comprehensives encompasses the interrelated narratives
of 1. Building a moderately prosperous society, 2. Deepening reform, 3. Gov-
erning the nation according to law, and 4. Tightening party discipline. The
purpose of the Four Comprehensives is to continue building socialism with
Chinese characteristics. 
This strategy’s grand aims to “build a moderately prosperous society,
deepen reform, govern the nation according to law, and tighten Party dis-
cipline” (5) has not faced sufficient critical academic scrutiny outside main-
land Chinese Marxist theorists, but should, due to the global implications
of the sheer scale of China’s economic growth and market reach. Further,
the four interrelated prongs represent a key to Xi Jinping Thought; together,
the prongs position the CCP at the centre of every aspect of economic de-
velopment, social cohesion, law, and governance, and as a totalising dis-
course, give little room for dissent. This paper’s purpose is to describe the
“four-pronged comprehensives strategy,” and to critically appraise key ten-
sion points and obstacles to its implementation.
Prong one: Building a “moderately
prosperous society” (6) 
The political reality of China’s socialist market economy follows a Leninist
ideology with Chinese characteristics that include experience of a social
system that recognises a central authority free from checks and balances
generally associated with legitimate rule of law. (7) Linking the authority
structure of the traditional Chinese dynastic rulers with the Leninist disci-
pline of today’s CCP, the Confucian governance model based on the family
and loyalty to authority maps well onto the theoretical frame of Xi Jinping
Thought. Reconciling Marxism-Leninism with the rampant pursuit of glori-
ous wealth is, however, another matter. Under Xi, the CCP constructs the
narrative of law-based governance as an instrument that helps legitimise
modernisation and wealth-building. Despite China’s phenomenal economic
growth, which, to some, may indicate that China is liberalising on a massive
scale, the Leninist concept of democratic centralism sheds light on how
such growth is achieved. Internal CCP practices guided by democratic cen-
tralism allows for debate, discussion, and the development of policy within
the CCP, but “only before a course of action has been decided upon.” (8) Party
unity and authority remains foremost in all economic reform.
Sustainable development and wealth inequality
Xi highlights the need to “invigorate China” through coordinated economic,
political, cultural, social, and ecological strategies. Building a moderately pros-
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perous society requires China to transition from a command economy to-
wards a socialist market economy characterised by “innovation-driven de-
velopment, rural vitalization, coordinated regional and sustainable
development and the military-civilian integration strategy.” (9) The challenges,
however, include transitioning from a position promoting strong economic
growth no matter the costs, to one that promotes sustainable develop-
ment. (10) Chinese macroeconomist Qiyuan Xu (2016: 73) argues that struc-
tural reforms in demand and supply issues are needed for sustainable
development. On the demand side, “China needs to reduce its reliance on
the two old engines of growth—investment and export—by stimulating do-
mestic consumption.” Key reforms include constructing a mature social
credit system and reducing transaction costs in the domestic market. Xu
(2016: 74) also links anti-corruption measures to the drive to boost domestic
consumption. Other reforms include improvements to the social welfare sys-
tem, reforms to the household registration (hukou) system, reductions in in-
come disparity, industry restructuring, and deregulation of the services sector.
Thomas Piketty (2014) identified China’s economic growth as highly un-
equal. The “new normal” is one of the most economically unequal and un-
just (and thus potentially unsustainable) societies in the world: the wealth
of the privileged few princelings and wealthy second-generation elites (fuer-
dai 富二代) is set against a backdrop of those whose income has, propor-
tionately, hardly increased at all. (11) There are two issues here: income and
wealth inequality. Knight (2017: 312) makes the point that “income inequal-
ity is now falling whereas wealth inequality continues to rise [and] has in-
creased rapidly in recent years.” The wealth imbalance indicates that the
“new normal” narrative covers up the emergence of a grossly imbalanced
capitalist class system. This is not lost on China’s leaders. Xi Jinping’s 2018
New Year’s speech, whilst not directly addressing China’s wealth imbalance,
spoke of poverty alleviation: 
We are now one big step closer to the completion of a moderately
prosperous society in all respects (…). It is our solemn commitment
to lift all rural residents living below the current poverty line out of
poverty by 2020. (12)
The government’s drive for sustainable development will require deepen-
ing economic reforms, including “more equitable distribution of rural and
urban services, better social welfare redistribution and marked improve-
ments to public goods and services, less corruption, and a fair and just legal
system more generally” (Xu 2016: 74). The challenges of sustaining China’s
economic growth while transitioning to a more sustainable development
model make it difficult to fit it into a particular paradigm. At the heart of
this interpretive puzzle is another paradox: a socialist market economy de-
veloped within a state-controlled property system in which all the land is
government-owned. This “property paradox” (Hu 2016: 132) contains an
important Chinese distinction: China’s urban growth has been historically
“land-based” rather than “population-based”; urban expansion has been ac-
companied by rural migration to cities (often without attaining official
urban residency) and subsequent rural depopulation and land loss. Addi-
tionally, China’s land use and urbanisation have both been subject to gov-
ernment monopoly and control, with local governments having political
and financial incentives to sell land and promote urban growth (Hu 2016).
Many problems, including corruption, risky financing, and peasant exploita-
tion, are attributed to this nexus of political power, monopoly practices, and
corrupt financial incentivisation. Another dilemma created by this property
paradox is house price inflation, which contributes significantly to China’s
inequality of total wealth. A decomposition analysis finds that house price
inflation can explain nearly half (45%) of the rise in China’s Gini coefficient
of wealth between 2002-13 (Knight 2017: 314). (13)
Rural property rights
Various recent reforms in rural property rights, such as liberalising the land
market and loosening hukou restrictions, relate to the dual urban-rural social
structure and aim to remove obstructions. Garrick and Bennett (2016: 214)
point out the legitimising narrative underpinning these reforms rests upon
the imperative of “stability maintenance.” Land disputes and related cor-
ruption are major sources of protest and instability. The Four Comprehen-
sives seeks to address these issues, but is confronted by a reality of
deeply-rooted structural and political obstacles (Zang 2016). When the in-
terests of the central and local governments diverge, rural property reform
becomes difficult (Guo 2016). The central government “sets the rules but
heavily relies on local governments to implement them.” (14) These are co-
nundrums for the government’s “deepening reform” narrative. 
Prong two: Deepening reform 
Xi’s report highlights various challenges for deepening reform, including
the creation of a modern public finance system, a fiscal relationship be-
tween central and local governments with clearly delineated authority and
responsibility; taxation reform, financial sector institutional reform, and an
improved regulatory framework for monetary and macro-prudential policy,
such as making interest and exchange rates more market-based. (15) Xi Jin-
ping’s “Explanation of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee De-
cision on Several Major Questions About Deepening Reform” (“Decision”) (16)
made it clear that “ideological unity continues to be forged around Deng
Xiaoping’s ‘two-hands’ formula: a market-based economy and uncompro-
mising political control.” (17) In the Decision, Xi emphasised that rule of law
should be advanced under CCP leadership, in line with socialism with Chi-
nese characteristics and with economic structural reform at the centre of
deepening reform. This view was reinforced in the amendment to the CCP
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constitution at the 19th Party Congress enshrining Xi’s thought as part of
the Party’s “guide for action.” (18) This guide for action indicates that a one-
Party-state under the Party’s unified command, with Xi at the helm, must
be maintained. (19) At the same time, important (non-Party) constituents in
society, such as non-state business people, urban professionals, the growing
middle class, and farmers, for example, must be more involved in decision-
making processes.
The decisive function of the market and the Belt and
Road initiative
The meaning of the phrase “decisive function of the market” remains
unclear; however, the expansion of the RMB’s role in international trade
and finance is clearly sought through China’s One Belt One Road initiative
(OBOR). (20) Recently incorporated into the CCP Constitution, OBOR seeks
to more closely link countries across Eurasia and the Indian Ocean. (21)
China’s policy banks are providing massive funds to allow Chinese enter-
prises to operate along the “Belt” and “Road” axes, with further funding
provided by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The Bank of
China has indicated OBOR’s aim is to make the RMB the main trading
and investment currency in the 65 countries involved. There are obstacles
to the rapid internationalisation of the RMB, however, including China’s
domestic financial system, in which interest rates are tightly controlled,
state-owned banks dominate financial intermediation, and the Chinese
stock market faces periodic (and deep) central government intervention.
Although Premier Li has insisted on the internationalisation of the RMB,
the scheme has slowed down due to the side effects of rapid internation-
alisation: for example, the lifting of capital controls led to record levels of
capital flight. 
“Market forces” and CCP ideology
At the international level, Chinese leadership in reforming global financial
structures is likely to face significant challenges until China’s own develop-
ment strategy has undergone fundamental change. Xi’s full report essen-
tially acknowledges this. Chinese banks pay interest rates well below
international standards without regulatory caps and China still has relatively
few alternatives for domestic consumer investment vehicles. (22) China’s
stock market is another example. When the domestic stock bubble burst,
the Communist Party leapt into action: regulators capped short-selling, pen-
sion funds pledged to buy more stocks, the government suspended initial
public offerings, and “brokers were required to set up a fund to buy shares
backed by the Central Bank.” (23) While China is, of course, not the first coun-
try to prop up a falling stock market, what makes China stand out is that
“it panicked when a correction of clearly overvalued shares had been ex-
pected.” (24) China’s economy cannot endure such ham-handed intervention
if it is to reform.
The “deepening reform” narrative thus faces immediate challenges. The
journey from a command to a liberalised economy is far from over. Xi indi-
cates the “basic dimension of the Chinese context—that our country is still
and will remain in the primary stage of socialism—has not changed.” (25) If
the market remains subordinated to the Party-state, it becomes more dif-
ficult for critical economic development to take place, and as the economy
grows ever more complex, the inadequacies of the institutions that underpin
it, especially the rule of law, will become more glaring.
Most recently, the Trump administration has targeted China as a potential
adversary in a trade war, which may impede China’s future economic growth
and economic stability. The United States has initiated investigations on
Chinese exports of steel and aluminium; unfair trade practices vis-à-vis in-
tellectual property rights, technology, and innovation; steel flanges; washing
machines; and solar panels. Preliminary findings from such investigations
have led to the US declaring a potential list of retaliatory tariffs on some
1,300 product lines. China said that it does not want a trade war, but would
respond in measures of equal strength and scale. (26) China has threatened
trade tariffs on goods that primarily hit Trump’s voting base —planes, cars,
and soybeans. However, in a speech at the Bo’ao Forum for Asia 2018, Xi
urged “dialogue rather than confrontation,” and against a zero-sum game
Cold War mentality. (27) He also pledged to ease restrictions on the domestic
banking and auto manufacturing sectors.
While the total impact of a potential trade war may have only a minor
effect on China’s economy, it is clear that China does not want an economic
confrontation with the US, in part because it would destabilise the reforms
Xi has implemented. It is also clear that Xi does not relish challenges, like a
potential trade war, on his presidency. On this analysis, US-China trade dis-
putes are likely to be resolved before the imposition of the complete pack-
age of retaliatory tariffs.
Prong three: Governing the nation according
to law
Under Xi’s leadership, socialist rule of law with Chinese characteristics is
the foundation for all legal reforms. According to the 2014 Plenum, the five
general principles guiding the reform process are (1) the leadership of the
Party, (2) the dominant position of the people, (3) equality before the law,
(4) the combination of ruling the country by law (yifa zhiguo 依法治国)
with the rule of virtue (dezhi 德治), and (5) the need for China to chart its
own path. The 19th Party Congress guarantees this path will be charted
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under the absolute leadership of the CCP through the Party Constitution,
even at the cost of “corresponding stagnation of institutional improvement”
(see Zhang: 2017). In short, socialist rule of law with Chinese characteristics
can be interpreted as an instrument to be vigorously enforced under CCP
leadership with the state a reflection of the will of the people. This is the
modern version of an intricate interaction between law and society in China
and has been a central feature of Chinese legal tradition. This contrasts with
historical Anglo-American interpretations of “rule of law” as articulated by
Dicey (1885), whereby rule of law rests upon a separation of powers doc-
trine and an adversarial system. In China, the idea that conflict (maodun 矛
盾) is resolved through traditional authority structures rather than through
the courts is still very much embedded in its culture and political thought.
One can see this in China’s preference to handle conflicts in the South China
Sea on a bilateral basis than through the International Tribunal for the Law
of the Sea.
Xi urges further “reform of the judicial system, and strengthened rule of
law awareness among all our people while also enhancing their moral in-
tegrity.” (28) Indeed, Xi has also stated the need for both rule of virtue and
rule of law where they are complementary, with some inescapable links
to traditional Chinese legal theory. (29) Xi Jinping Thought may be viewed
by the Party as better serving citizens as a state instrument in contrast
with the “separation of powers” doctrine characteristic of Western legal
systems. However, China does have its own a separation of powers issue:
“between the Party and the state within a Party-state” (Zhang 2017). Al-
though Zhang argues “the recent challenges to rule of law in China don’t
necessarily indicate its possible failure,” others argue that Anglo-American
principles deliver little more than meaningless “feel-good” language (see
Feng 2016; Clarke 2014). Peerenboom (2014: 8) argues that it is “not sur-
prising to see this type of pragmatic, measured, ameliorative language at
this stage of development [and] that as a middle-income country, China
faces a long, hard slog in establishing rule of law [with] progress slow and
incremental without miracle solutions, and that reforms in one area give
rise to new problems, often in other areas.” Pils (2015: 83) draws attention
to the Decisions’ “deeply illiberal commitment to power concentration
and Party supremacy over law.” (30) In this Pils does not implicitly take for
granted that the Chinese system will, at some point in time, turn into a
full-blend “rule of law,” but rather sees the rejection of constitutionalism
and judicial independence as reflecting a realpolitik that Chinese leaders
are not about to relinquish the Leninist principle of the law being under
Party-state control/supervision. 
Taboo on judicial independence
Q. Zhang (2016: 29) points out that there is a high degree of scepticism
as to whether judicial reform can truly take place. Given that the legal sys-
tem is dominated by the Party and its objectives, the judiciary can do little
that is not CCP-sanctioned. Civil rights activists and women’s rights activists
were charged in 2015 with such crimes as “picking quarrels and causing
trouble;” (31) NGOs are being heavily circumscribed, and there is little the
judiciary can do to prevent or ameliorate such overt political suppression. (32)
Judicial independence has recently been added to the list of taboo subjects
in China. Chief Justice Zhou Qiang was quoted in the state-run Chinese
News Service (15 January 2017) as saying, “China’s courts must firmly resist
the western idea of judicial independence and other ideologies which
threaten the leadership of the ruling Communist Party.” (33)
Prong three of the Four Comprehensives reinforces the Party’s leading role
in judicial reform, but it is unclear whether Party leadership can be recon-
ciled with the concept of “rule of law” as resting upon the principle that law
is impartially applied to all individuals and public institutions. Hand’s as-
sessment (2016: 30) of socialist constitutional supervision models and
prospects for a constitutional supervision committee helps bring China’s
socialist rule by law narrative into focus. Over the past two decades, citizens
have tried using constitutional arguments and legal mechanisms to “pro-
mote constitutional interpretations that incorporate some meaningful con-
straints on Party power” (Chen 2010: 878). But Hand’s view (2016) of the
Fourth Plenum Decision is that such constitutional interpretation is “in-
tended to stifle such citizen efforts” and put obedience to Party leadership
at the core of the socialist rule of law. (34)
Although the legal system may be a useful tool to discipline the lower
levels of the bureaucracy, ensure the implementation of economic policy,
and protect rights within limits, it is only the Party that is the final arbiter
of fundamental political questions implicit in many constitutional claims. (35)
Hand (2016: 43) suggests that the Party may fear that even the modest
step of establishing a weak constitutional supervision committee “could
generate ideological confusion.” 
Criticism and the supremacy of the CCP
In a tightening political-legal environment, with the Party emphasising
its supremacy in China’s constitutional order and Xi asserting dominance
over the Party, Xi has emerged as China’s most powerful leader since Mao.
Current ideological campaigns raise some uncomfortable memories of the
Mao era. Pils (2016) argues that “rule by fear” is more than just a regime
survival strategy but a political philosophy built into CCP ideology. History
suggests that such a concentration of power in one person is dangerous
as there are few constitutional safeguards against it. On 9 July 2015, Chi-
nese police rounded up and interrogated about 300 rights lawyers, legal
assistants, and activists across the country, now infamously named the
“709” crackdown. Most have now been released, but “as long as the Chi-
nese government treats legal defence work as anti-state activity, confi-
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dence in the country’s legal system will remain low.” (36) Pils’s (2017) view
is that the anti-liberal re-conception of legal process allows “rule by fear”
techniques to play an increasingly prominent role and to be applied in a
more open manner. In the eight-year sentence given to rights advocate
Wu Gan in December 2017 by the Tianjin Intermediate People’s Court, this
appears to be the case. This is one of the harshest sentences given amid
the ongoing crackdown on human rights activism and legal advocacy and
underlines how, under Xi Jinping, activists such as Wu Gan “who once sur-
vived at the edge of official tolerance have come under concerted attack
from the police, prosecutors and courts, with the state news media often
acting as a cheerleader.” (37)
Examination of the Decision and Document No. 9 shows the overarching
principle is enhancement of the “Party’s authority and control over legal
procedure[s] and outcomes of politically sensitive cases” (Feng 2016: 56).
The CCP positions law reform as a necessary tool for the promotion of eco-
nomic growth intended to instil more public faith in the legal system by
facilitating legal protection of economic interests. Moves to curb local pro-
tectionism, reduce grassroots corruption in the court system, and uphold
justice in ordinary legal proceedings (i.e., those without political signifi-
cance) are essentially politically motivated with the aim of improving the
Party’s image (Feng 2016). 
A principal concern of Feng’s is the conflation of anti-corruption measures
and the elimination of dissent and political opposition, both real and imag-
ined. Reform remains bound to Leninist historical frameworks dressed up
in more contemporary, characteristically Chinese narratives. Indeed, China
is also requiring individuals to increasingly self-censor what they say online.
Prominent human-rights activist Lee Ming-Chee was recently convicted on
the basis of his Facebook posts from Taiwan as evidence against him; China
is now punishing people for critical content published outside China to au-
diences not based in China. (38) The de facto application of “rule of fear” can
actually undermine the de jure principle of “rule of law” in so far as law may
be applied selectively to serve non-legal interests including “protection” of
the well-connected and/or to increase one’s power and influence. This con-
flation draws on “extra-legal” methods and can be interpreted as part of
the CPP’s endgame of retaining power. Without adequate checks and bal-
ances, political and legal development —and civil society more generally—
is heavily circumscribed by the overarching authority of the Party-state.
Prong four: Tightening Party discipline
Xi Jinping’s full report identifies “sweeping efforts to strengthen Party lead-
ership and Party building (…) [and a] commitment to examining ourselves in
the mirror, tidying our attire, taking a bath, and treating our ailments.” (39) In
fact this fourth prong of the Comprehensives has its own propaganda cam-
paign: the “Three Stricts, Three Earnests” (“Three Stricts”) campaign (com-
monly known on websites as “Three Stricts and Three Honests”). (40) The
campaign to improve Party discipline and cadre conduct promotes elements
of the Core Socialist Values (Gow 2017: 106). (41) Core socialist values reflect
normative concepts as defined by the CCP, which are “diametrically opposed
to the common-sense usage of the same terms used in western liberal
thought, including freedom, democracy, civility and rule of law.” By building
a normative consensus around socialist values, the CCP is seeking to
strengthen its dominant position, and the law is used to generate this con-
sensus. There is therefore a powerful connection between prongs three and
four of the Comprehensives in that tightening of Party discipline and devel-
oping procedural justice in China are tied together, as the following discussion
briefly explores.
Corruption and Party discipline 
The Sixth Plenum approved two key documents focused on strengthening
Party discipline: “Guidelines on Inner-Party Life in the New Situation” and
“Party Regulations on Inner-Party Supervision.” The “new situation” includes
the massive institutionalised anti-corruption campaign launched by Xi in
2013, which has increased the power of leaders at the top of the Party hier-
archy with Xi as commander-in-chief. Key mechanisms to ensure “political
unity” are Party “study sessions” and “democratic life meetings” focusing on
Party ideology. According to Doyon and Godement (2017: 4), these meetings
are essentially “self-criticisms” meant to ensure the unity and purity of the
Party and to eradicate the “four (bad) work styles”—formalism, bureaucracy,
hedonism, and extravagance. These measures serve to strengthen the Leninist
structure of China’s “democratic centralism” and are aided by the softening
of reforms to procedural justice and the significant challenges to judicial in-
dependence outlined above. This is especially the case in relation to sensitive
matters, including the Party’s recent reliance on political-legal committees
and its own extra-legal mechanism, shuanggui (双规), used to fight corruption.
Concerns over the misuse of shuanggui reached Xi, who called upon the Party
to deepen reform by formulating a “national supervision law.” (42) Supervisory
commissions will be given “responsibilities, powers and means of investigation
in accordance with law and the practice of shuanggui will be replaced by de-
tention.” (43) Some are concerned that this has the potential to become a new
“black box” alongside China’s justice system (Wuthnow 2017: 886).
The notion of procedural justice is a recent introduction to China and
“needs time to be developed and adapted to local conditions” (Chen 2016:
96). However, this argument implies a tolerance of extrajudicial measures
to discipline Party members who are perceived to have strayed from the
strict and virtuous requirements of today’s CCP. From the Gang of Four trial
to Bo Xilai’s downfall and Xi Jinping’s “tigers and flies” (laohu cangying yiqi
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da 老虎苍蝇一起打) campaign, there are similarities and continuities in the
CCP’s anti-corruption measures with the Party as the main actor, neutral-
ising enemies through publicised campaigns, trials, and non-judicial anti-
corruption measures that continue to rely on Maoist rhetoric for
legitimisation. Under the direction of the CCP, anti-corruption campaigns
appear not only to remove corrupt officials but also those perceived to be
politically unreliable or destructive to the Party (Ho 2016; 2012). Ironically,
Bo himself used the organised crime crackdown in Chongqing to extort busi-
nessmen and remove individuals he perceived as threats to his authority. 
Discipline and punishment
Under Xi’s leadership, the broader anti-corruption campaign has come to
include targeting corruption within the military and to emphasise “the Party’s
absolute leadership over the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).” (44) Furthermore,
the domestic anti-corruption campaign may yet have international impli-
cations, as China tenaciously pursues corrupt “fugitives” who have fled over-
seas to escape charges at home. (45) As Fu (2014) argues, corruption is closely
correlated with legitimacy, and political leaders in China have found it ex-
pedient to use anti-corruption campaigns to remove their political foes and
rein in the bureaucracy while enhancing their legitimacy in the eyes of the
general public. Fu’s “Wielding the Sword” argument is that the Party’s anti-
corruption campaign is a tool for the concentration of political power. The
selective mobilisation of key law reforms has the effect of negating the po-
tential for alternative discourses and is a central weapon in the Comprehen-
sives’ fourth prong.
Against the backdrop of China’s anti-corruption campaign and drive to
tighten Party discipline, Ho’s (2016: 109) view on the short- to medium-
term outlook for consistent procedural fairness and transparent use of the
courts is “not so encouraging.” For the longer term, there is hope that the
improvements to judicial capability, procedural fairness, and the legal sys-
tem across China more generally can be built upon. General-Secretary Xi
puts the rights narrative in contemporary Party context by stating that
China must only “borrow beneficial fruits of political civilization of mankind,
but we must not copy Western political institutions and models, and must
not accept any condescending preaches [sic] of foreign countries.” (46)
Conclusion 
The underlying purpose of Xi Jinping Thought is to continue the quest of
realising the Chinese Dream. Against a backdrop of China’s rising interna-
tional assertiveness and of domestic power increasingly vested in Xi Jinping,
it is no surprise that the country’s constitution was amended to enable Xi’s
reign to extend beyond the former 10-year limit. However, close analysis
of Xi Jinping Thought reveals points at which the Leninist guardianship of
Chinese society has frail edges. The delicate balancing act of deepening mar-
ket reform and socio-economic transformation occurs under an authoritar-
ian leadership model. The challenges of sustaining China’s economic growth
while maintaining a firm grip on Chinese society and strengthening Party
control over the country are large, and in part why Xi Jinping Thought has
been elevated to the highest levels of Chinese Communist Party dogma. Xi
himself acknowledges some of these frailties, referring to “acute problems
caused by unbalanced and inadequate development.” (47) Because of China’s
global ambitions, it has undertaken multiple reforms that include mod-
ernising its military, extending its reach far beyond Asia into the Pacific, and
fostering trade with such initiatives such as One Belt, One Road, in addition
to market reforms necessary for greater economic growth. Whether China
realises its Dream will depend, in large part, on how well Xi Jinping and the
Party navigate the rocky shoals of such complex reform and expansion.
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